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Abstract 
 
Being a delta, one third of the Dutch territory consists of flood-prone areas. This article 
discusses how the local civil protection system in the Netherlands responds to increasing 
climate change-induced flooding risks in terms of risk perception and action. Case studies on 
three Safety Regions are used to better understand the relation between climate change risk 
and changes in civil protection systems and practices. Data is presented that suggest that a 
minimum level of climate change risk awareness is present and that proactive action from the 
civil protection system is exceptional.  
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1 Introduction 
Although we are unable to mark them as climate change impacts, natural hazards are now 
increasingly occurring and causing increasing damage (O’Brien, ’Keefe, Rose & Wisner 
2006). The Netherlands are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise as 60% of its territory is 
located below sea level. Statistics Netherlands (CBS) estimates that currently one third of the 
Dutch economy is at risk from climate change-induced flooding risk as the flood-prone parts 
of the country accommodate 6 million people and one third of the GNP (CBS 2009). 
Immediate flooding risk is not at stake, as these flood-prone parts are protected by a 
sophisticated flooding prevention system that developed over centuries. Yet residual risks 
remain: In 1953, a combination of severe winds and extremely high tide caused the North Sea 
Flood by breaching through the flooding defence works in the south-western part of the 
country resulting in 1,800 fatalities.  
 After the North Sea Flood, the Dutch government implemented measures to prevent 
sea flooding ‘once and for all’. Based on the population size and economical value of the area, 
extremely high protection levels were determined for flood-prone regions (up to 1/10,000, 
meaning that the flood defence works are designed to resist water levels occurring once per 
10,000 years). Full trust in the reliability of the flood defence works, however, also laid the 
foundation for the general feeling of being safe ‘behind our dykes’. Flooding risk became a 
notion connected to the past. Large-scale residential districts and industries were developed in 
the flood-prone, low-lying areas in the west of the country.  
 After decades of large investments in sea flooding protection, however, the protection 
against river flooding was now lagging behind. In addition, new residential areas and 
hospitals were built on riverbanks, while due to upstream developments (e.g. deforestation) 
rivers discharge much faster than in the past. The 1990s recorded two events of extreme 
precipitation hitting the catchment areas of the Meuse and the Rhine Rivers resulting in large-
scale flooding in the Netherlands. In 1993, 12,000 people were evacuated from the Meuse 
valley in the Limburg region, many livestock drowned. Two years later, 25,000 people (and 
all livestock) were evacuated from parts of the Rivierengebied region that were at direct 
flooding risk –this is the largest post-war evacuation in the country.  
After these river floods, politicians decided that the major rivers IJssel, Rhine and 
Meuse should be given more ‘room’ instead of using the riverbanks as urban development 
areas. The new approach was implemented in the national programme ‘Room for the River’ 
that consists of many hydrographical projects on dyke improvement, dyke shifting, lowering 
of flooding beds and removing obstacles along the rivers. The public was informed on the 
new vision in the campaign ‘The Netherlands live with Water’ through activities and media 
attention. 
 In the early 2000s, after Katrina had hit New Orleans, another shift in flood risk 
perception took place as politicians now realised that our society is also vulnerable and that 
we could also be struck by such a flooding catastrophe (TMO 2009). Two committees were 
appointed to improve the flooding preparedness of the Netherlands: The Delta Commission 
and the Flooding Management Task Force (TMO). TMO’s assignment was to improve the 
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organisational dimension in flooding events, resulting in strategies and scenarios for the most 
vulnerable areas in the country –climate change threats as such, however, did not appear to be 
of decisive significance in its emerge. The Delta Commission had to advise the national 
government on how to become ‘climate proof’ in the century to come. The commission 
advised to strengthen dykes and embankments tenfold (Delta Commission 2008).  
 The issue of water is indeed high on the policy agenda, as parallel to the Delta 
Commission’s activities also an update of the Administrative Agreement on Water (NBW-
Actueel) was signed by the national, regional and local authorities agreeing that the Dutch 
water system should jointly be put in order at the lowest possible costs. The update was 
inspired by the fact that new climate change scenarios were available (VNG 2008).  Yet 
technical solutions to prevent us from future flooding are not so much the problem. 
Difficulties arise when implementing as the current institutional setting does not allow 
structural solutions to be implemented; at best they result in incidental solutions (Tol et al 
2003).  
 Moreover, climate change does not only include flooding risk induced by sea level rise 
and increasing river discharges, but ‘poses novel risks often outside the range of experience, 
such as impacts related to drought [and] heat waves’ (Adger et al. 2007, p. 719). Increasing 
frequency of peak rains, heat waves and storms are foreseen for the Netherlands (KNMI 
2006). These events are already causing substantial damage, and many deaths in case of heat 
waves; the 2006 heat wave caused 1,000 Dutch heat-related deaths pushing the Netherlands to 
position four of the world rankings of natural disasters fatalities (EMDAT 2007). Derived 
impacts from primary climate change impacts, such as drought, have also already caused 
serious troubles. The potential impacts from climate change on countries therefore can be 
seen as a national security issue (Barnett 2003). The National Safety Strategy indicates 
heat/drought to be ‘probable’ and causing ‘considerably to severe impact’; sea flooding is 
considered to be ‘very unlikely’, but causing ‘catastrophic’ impacts (our translations; Ministry 
BZK 2008).  
 The civil protection system in the Netherlands is now facing a various set of climate 
change-related impacts. Impacts from climate change as such might not be completely new, 
still the frequency and size of extreme weather events are expected to change and this is 
something to anticipate on. The civil protection system can adapt its practices and methods at 
the operational level and its policy and strategies at the strategic level. So far, some studies 
are available on the interface of climate change and disaster management (Barnett 2003; 
O'Brien, O'Keefe, Rose & Wisner 2006; Thomalla, Downing, Spanger-Siegfried, Han & 
Rockstrom 2006), but little research applies a policy focus by exploring the role of adaptive 
capacity of civil protection systems.  
 This paper analyses how the Dutch civil protection system is currently incorporating 
climate change impacts into their practices and policies. We determine the degree to which 
the system of civil protection in the Netherlands is currently preparing for climate change by 
addressing the following research questions: 1) what are the recent institutional changes in the 
Dutch civil protection system? 2) what are recent changes in civil protection practice and civil 
protection actor perceptions of climate risks? and 3) to what extend are the recent changes in 
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the civil protection system caused by the perception of climate changes risk, and what were 
driving factors for these changes? In the following, first we present the method, concepts and 
data applied in the study (Section 2). We continue with discussing the background of our 
study (Section 3) and then the findings and results (Section 4). We close the paper by 
presenting our conclusions (Section 5). 
2 Research methodology and data used 
2.1 Concepts used in the study 
Throughout the study, we focus on the concepts of adaptation, adaptive capacity and risk 
perception when addressing the research questions presented in the previous section. In fact, 
we investigate to what extend the Dutch civil protection system is adapting to climate change. 
We employ the concept of civil protection as to describe the public institutions that are 
concerned with the safety of the Dutch society –in our study we focus on the local and 
regional level.  
 Adaptation in the climate change literature generally refers to a process, action or 
outcome in a system in order for the system to better cope with, manage or adjust to some 
changing condition, stress, hazard or opportunity. Based on their timing, adaptations can be 
anticipatory or reactive, and depending on their degree of spontaneity they can be autonomous 
or planned (Smit & Wandel 2006). In the Netherlands, traditional adaptation is reactive, as it 
has involved dyke enforcements in the flooding aftermath. Sub-national adaptation to climate 
change is a research theme that has been given increasing interest (Adger & Vincent 2005; 
Adger, Arnell & Tompkins 2005; Naess et al. 2005; Wall & Marzall 2006; Wilson 2006).   
Adaptation is intimately associated with the concept of adaptive capacity which 
reflects the ‘capability of the system to cope, adapt, or recover from the effects of climate 
change’ (Wall & Marzall 2006). The IPCC defines adaptive capacity as the ‘the ability of a 
system to adjust to climate change’ (IPCC 2007). Community-based analyses have shown that 
conditions that shape adaptive capacity and hence create the need and opportunities for 
adaptation are community specific. Adaptive capacity can be influenced by many non-
climatic drivers such as managerial ability, access to financial, technological, and information 
resources and infrastructure. A system’s adaptive capacity is not static, but flexible and 
responds to changes in economic, social, political and institutional conditions over time (Smit 
& Wandel 2006).  
 We apply the concept of risk perception to understand how actors deal with climate 
change risks. Having started in the nuclear debate of the 1960s, risk perception research is 
now commonly applied to explain risk acceptance not only from technical benefits, but also 
including the subjective dimension (Sjöberg 2000). Risk perception is a very relevant concept 
for it can contribute to understanding why action is absent or taken to prepare for climate 
change impacts. A national study showed that Americans perceive climate change as ‘a 
moderate risk that will predominantly impact geographically and temporarily distant people 
and places’ (Leiserowitz 2005, p. 1433). The notion of ‘dangerous’ climate change, 
Leiserowitz (2005) continues, is thus not only disputed among scientists and policy makers, 
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but also among the general public. Climate change is also perceived as a serious problem by 
Europeans: they consider the changing climate to be the second most serious problem of our 
time, after the number one problem is poverty, the lack of food and drinking water (EC 2008). 
2.2 Case study selection  
The case study methodology is applied as it enables us to derive new hypotheses and 
‘examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in detail’ (George & Bennett 
2005, p. 21). The hypothesis-generating method for case studies in particular (Levy 2008) is 
of great relevance as we will examine our cases with the purpose to develop more general 
theoretical propositions on the role of geography, risk awareness and adaptive capacity when 
analysing the adoption of the climate change issue in the Dutch civil protection system. In the 
selection of the cases, geographic location and historical experience with (potential climate-
induced) disasters are applied as the two conditions that will influence the degree of 
adaptability of the regional civil protection systems. Of all climate-induced risks we 
concentrate on flooding risk caused by sea level rise, increasing river discharges and 
increasing precipitation quantities as these impacts are most widely known and most covered 
in current adaptation projects. We therefore consider ‘water safety’ most likely to be first 
implemented by the civil protection system too.  
 The cases we selected are so-called Safety Regions. The Safety Regions constitute 
today’s key civil protection system where all civil protection actors cooperate. The current 
division of 25 Safety Regions correspond to the similar police force regions and the fire 
brigade regions (WVR 2009). The three Safety Regions studied are: Rotterdam-Rijnmond 
(flooding risk from sea level rise, increasing river discharges and heavier precipitation), 
IJsselland (flooding risk from increasing river discharges and heavier precipitation) and 
Twente (flooding risk from heavier precipitation). The cases have different geographic 
locations and differ in historical experiences with extreme weather events.  Their locations are 
indicated in Figure1.  
 Located on the riverbanks of the Meuse, Rotterdam is in close proximity of the North 
Sea is and situated in the most densely populated part of the country. Most of its territory is 
located at low-lying, below sea-level locations and some is also outer-dyke. The 
Measlantkering Storm Surge Barrier (1997) was constructed to protect the Rotterdam area 
from storm surge events. The barrier was designed for a sea level rise of 60 cm in 100 years. 
Vulnerable in the Rotterdam area are not only the flood-prone parts of the area, but also the 
petrochemical industries and the harbour area. Rotterdam did not recently experience extreme 
weather events, but the 1953 North Sea Flood caused flooding in the southern parts of 
Rotterdam and the city hosted about 10,000 refugees (Rotterdam Municipal Archives 2009).  
IJsselland, a semi-rural area with pastures along the IJssel and woods in the east, is 
located in the heart of the country and includes 2 midsized cities. Parts of IJsselland territory 
are prone to flooding from the IJssel River or the IJsselmeer Lake. The Ramspol Storm Surge 
Barrier (2002) was constructed to protect the region from flooding from the IJsselmeer Lake. 
The barrier is designed to resist increasing water levels up to 60 cm, while it is now being 
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Figure 1 Safety Regions division with the study regions indicated  
Map adopted from Zorgatlas, www.zorgatlas.nl 
 
 
 
discussed that the water levels of the IJsselmeer Lake should be elevated to 1.5 m. All levels 
of government in the IJsselland region cooperate in realising the ‘Bypass of Kampen’, which 
is the constructing of an additional mouth to the River IJssel. This project is communicated to 
be a climate change adaptation measure, as it relieves bottle necks in the river that will 
become weaker in the future. IJsselland did not face any severe flooding or extreme weather 
events recently. 
Twente is a semi-rural area with agriculture, woods and some midsized cities 
bordering to Germany. Located on higher sandy grounds, the region does not face immediate 
flooding risk from large rivers. Still, some smaller rivers pass the area and as the landscape is 
not fully flat, local water nuisance regularly occurs. Moreover, Twente particularly faces 
drought problems in summer time–and the frequency of these problems will only increase. 
Regarding our study, Twente is interesting as a control case where no concrete severe climate 
change risks are be expected, but where the level of civil protection action might me 
influenced by other factors. Recently, the region was struck by extremely heavy rainfall 
resulting in severe local flooding. 
2.2 Data sources and coverage 
The data collected for this paper covers quantitative and qualitative material on institutional 
changes in the Dutch civil protection system, changes in its working practice and changes in 
risk perceptions of Dutch civil protection actors. Originating from two research projects, both 
were driven by the ambition to understand the driving factors behind system changes in the 
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Dutch regional civil protection system and connections between these changes and climate 
change. The projects ran parallel with each other in 2009 and 2010. 
The Rotterdam case was studied for an international project that also investigated Malmo and 
Bergen in order to draw lessons on civil protection adaptation in the three north-west 
European countries Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. The data for Rotterdam was 
collected by conducting semi-structured interviews on the policy and practices regarding 
natural hazards and the perceptions of climate change risks at the key civil protection 
institutes. We interviewed civil servants employed with Rotterdam municipality, Rotterdam-
Rijnmond Safety Region and Schieland and Krimpenerwaard Water Board. The data from the 
interviews combined with investigations on local and national policy documents and other 
grey material resulted in a case study report (Van den Berg & Coenen 2010) and a conference 
paper (Groven, Van den Berg, Carlsson-Kanyama, Aall & Coenen forthcoming).  
 The data for IJsselland and Twente was gathered through a quantitative survey that 
was performed in 2010 among the 25 Overijssel municipalities. With the survey we aimed to 
determine the state of local climate policy actions and perceptions in the province. A group of 
76 local civil servants responsible for policy making in the domains of spatial planning, water 
management and the environment were identified and invited to complete a questionnaire 
through the web. In total, 64 respondents (84%) in 24 municipalities completed the 
questionnaire. The survey was part of a larger in-depth study on the degree of civil 
preparedness for climate change of the local level in the Dutch region of Overijssel. 
3 Analysing the Dutch civil protection system 
3.1 A multilevel system for civil protection  
In contrast to neighbouring Belgium and Germany, or comparable welfare states such as 
Sweden and Norway, the Netherlands has no separate governmental body responsible for civil 
protection. One historical exception to this pattern is the Dutch government’s post-war 
initiative to establish the organisation ‘Protecting Population’ (in Dutch: Bescherming 
Bevolking, BB) in 1952 based on its counterpart from the UK. This civil defence organisation 
was coordinated by the Minister of the Interior. Its aim was to protect civilians “From the 
consequences of war” (our own translation of the title; WBB 1952). At its height in 1956, the 
organisation consisted of 160,000 voluntary members. From then on, the number of 
volunteers only decreased resulting in the organisation’s discontinuation in 1986 (IBB 1986). 
Its tasks were handed over to the regional fire brigade and the Dutch Red Cross. 
The Dutch Disaster Law (in Dutch: Wet op rampen en zware ongevallen; WRZO 
1985) was introduced in 1985 –prior to the formal dissolution of the BB. It provides for a 
legal framework for civil protection by the local government. According to this law, “A 
disaster or heavy accident is an event which severely disturbs the public safety and seriously 
threatens or damages the life and safety of many people” (our translation from Article 1b 
WRZO 1985). Threat of war as a key focus for civil protection is now replaced by ‘any’ 
disturbing and seriously threatening or damaging event. From the perspective of our research 
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it is interesting to conclude that within the legal framework for disaster management, 
changing climatic impacts are not considered at all.  
Nor are they considered in the current Dutch flooding policy, which traditionally has a very 
strong emphasis on prevention, resulting from 1,000 years of dyke construction. The other 
Safety Chain links (pro-action, preparation, response and recovery) are lesser developed 
(Table 1). In such a situation, it is rather difficult to organise preparedness, response and 
recovery for very unlikely, but extreme-impact flood events (Saeijs, van Alphen, Helsloot & 
ten Brinke 2008). Climate change, however, urges for a broader approach as its impacts are 
difficult to anticipate on as we did not experience them before. We should therefore put more 
emphasise on the other links, particular the pro-action should receive more attention as it 
entails avoiding a disaster to happen at the first place, for example by preventing the 
development of flood-prone areas and to realise a closer cooperation between spatial planning 
and water management. 
 We now leave the framework and go ‘into’ the system of civil protection to 
understand how it works. All levels of government have responsibilities concerning safety 
and disaster management. Whether or not their efforts are employed depends on the scale of 
the (potential) crisis or disaster. In general, the local government is responsible for 
preparations and crisis management pertaining to local events. When incidents exceed 
municipal borders, the province will become involved. In case of large-scale incidents, the 
national level is responsible. In line of hierarchy, the Water Boards are situated between the 
regional and local authorities. These water authorities prevent the Dutch from getting ‘wet 
feet’ by managing discharging of precipitation and maintaining water ways and dykes. They 
also distribute tap water and care for the purification of waste water. The National Water 
Executive (Rijkswaterstaat) is responsible for the maintenance of primary dykes and barriers. 
 At all levels of government, a centrally appointed administrator is responsible for 
public order and security. Historically, these officers were appointed by the Queen which is 
still the case today with respectively the Provincial Governor (Commisaris van de Koningin) 
and the dijkgraaf (head of the water board; his responsibilities are similar to a mayor’s) at 
regional level and the mayor at local level. At regional level, the Provincial Governor is 
responsible for public order and safety in his respective province (the Netherlands consists of 
twelve provinces). He or she also secures good cooperation between all civil protection 
institutions in the province. The province has its own disaster plan. Also Water Boards have 
civil protection responsibilities. The dijkgraaf is authorised to take all necessary safety 
decisions (such as physical actions on dyke improvements) as long as they do not conflict 
with the Dutch Constitution or international agreements. The Water Board is obliged to have a 
disaster plan including a risk-assessment of all water works in its district. The Water Board 
must inform all concerned municipal boards on the risks and measures concerned with water 
safety in its district.  
Being the most important link responsible for local public order, the mayor is given 
powers to maintain safety and security in his municipality as a member of the regional fire 
brigade board in case of (reasonable fears for) a disaster or heavy accident. Because of this, 
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Table 1 Applying the safety chain on Dutch flood risk management 
 Safety Chain Links Efforts 
Risk management Pro-action Strong  
 Prevention Very  strong 
Crisis management Preparation Strong  
 Response  Strong  
 Recovery Average  
Data adopted from Saeijs, van Alphen, Helsloot, & ten Brinke (2008), p. 2, 7. 
 
the Mayor’s Network (Nederlands Genootschap van Burgemeesters) has a strong focus on 
crisis management (but not on risk management, see Table 1). On its website 
www.burgemeesters.nl, evaluations on recent disasters are available including an interview 
with the mayor responsible. Portfolios are available on high water and critical infrastructure 
breakdowns.  
 A municipality has to deliver a four-year disaster plan containing a risk-assessment of 
18 ‘regular’ disasters (maatrampen), of which flooding and extreme weather events are the 
only climatic disasters. Furthermore, the Disaster Law prescribes the local tasks in civil 
protection. These 30 tasks are divided between the municipality, the police, the fire brigade 
and the medical rescue services. In this division of tasks, the municipality is responsible for 
most tasks dealing with civil protection, such as public alerts and communication, shelter 
provision and casualty registering.  
3.2 Recent institutional changes in the civil protection system 
A number of changes in the institutional framework of civil protection took place in the last 
decade. Most importantly was the development of a system of so-called ‘Safety Regions’ 
inspired by two large-scale, but non-weather-related disasters in 2000. In May, the country 
was shocked by an explosion of a fireworks warehouse in Enschede resulting in 22 casualties 
and a whole residential area being destroyed; and on New Year's Eve a café in Volendam 
burned down killing 14 youngsters. The two events demonstrated a stronger need for closer 
cooperation between the civil protection institutions at regional level. This will be formalised 
in Safety Regions that are now being established throughout the country.  
The institutional framework for civil protection at the Safety Region consists of 
national, provincial and municipal actors (Table 2). At the national level, the main actors are 
the ministries of the Interior and Kingdom Affairs (BZK), Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM) and Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W).2 BZK 
is primarily responsible for public order and safety, whereas VROM is responsible for the 
prevention of ecological disasters, regarding for example drinking water. V&W is particularly 
responsible for infrastructure-related safety, including the maintaining of dykes and storm 
surge barriers. Every Safety Region also has a military advisor. The division of 25 Safety 
Regions correspond to the similar police force regions and the fire brigade regions (WVR 
2009). The Safety Regions constitute today’s key civil protection system. 
                                               
2 As from October 14, 2010, a new national government was established that uses follow a new division of 
ministries. In this paper, we reflect on the division that was used during several previous cabinet periods. 
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Our examination of recent changes in the policy and practices of the civil protection systems 
in the cases studied confirmed that the national development of the Safety Regions was rather 
fundamental. Interviewees in Rotterdam call the recent emergence of the safety region system 
the major change within the Rotterdam civil protection system. Since close cooperation 
already existed between the actors of the Safety Region Rotterdam-Rijnmond, the emergence 
of the safety region is thus a formal consolidation of existing ties. However, Rotterdam 
interviewees stressed the fact that the concept of Safety Regions is new and that it will take 
time and efforts to make things run smoothly. The far-reaching safety region development 
(given the early stage that it is in now) should be followed-up in light of climate-change 
preparedness.  
4 Preparing for climate change by the civil protection system  
4.1 Climate change and developments in civil protection practices 
Our study of three Safety Regions showed that so far increased flooding risk from climate 
change does not have changed the civil protection practices. Flooding risk is already part of 
‘regular’ risk and crisis management plans, and the other ‘regular’ disaster type extreme 
weather events are assessed as being hard to prepare for. Increasing flooding risks are not yet 
part of the local disaster plans in our case studies nor are have particular plans developed yet 
in the Twente or IJsselland region that are inspired by climate change. The ‘Twente flood’ in 
August 2010 caused major damage (insurer Interpolis estimated 9 million euro; TC Tubantia 
2010) and some local policy attention (for instance, an evacuation planning in the village 
Losser and a flood protocol in Borne), but no pro-active changes are foreseen yet in this 
region.  
 In Rotterdam, by contrast, flooding risk awareness was raised in 2008 when the region 
was a central case in the Flooding Management Task Force TMO. TMO’s assignment to 
improve the flood preparedness in the Netherlands, however, did not primarily be inspired by 
climate change threats. Flooding risk in Rotterdam is high on the policy agenda anyhow, as 
Water Plan 2 aims at a waterproof city by 2030; climate change induced sea-level rise and 
increasing precipitation quantities play a leading role in this plan. It is interesting that Water 
Plan 2 combines both the water management task of the Water Boards and the civil protection 
and spatial development tasks of the municipality.  
  A higher frequency of heat waves caused by climate change also affects the domain 
of public health, which is a municipal responsibility. The municipal health care system is 
organised in the Public Health Services (GGD), and GGD obtains its knowledge from the 
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), the leading Dutch centre of 
expertise in the fields of health, nutrition and environmental protection. Although RIVM has 
published several reports on the health effects of climate change on the Netherlands, we 
earlier found that limited attention is paid to public health in climate adaptation strategies 
(Van den Berg, Lafferty & Coenen 2010). A GGD interviewee confirmed that in the Twente 
region, no municipality requested the regional GGD for additional measures on health risks, 
which prevents the development of proactive health measurements at the local level. 
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Table 2 Actors participating in the Safety Region structure 
National actors Regional actors Local actors Private actors 
BZK  Province  Fire Brigade Drinking water companies 
V&W Water Board Medical rescue  Transport companies 
VROM Public Prosecutor Police Hospital(s) 
Defence  Municipalities Electricity  companies 
 
Heat waves are not specifically being considered in the municipality disaster plans and we did 
not find any specific local or regional heat plans (with the exception of the national Heat Plan 
that instructs how particular vulnerable groups should deal with heat). Rotterdam has 
indicated heat and heat-related affects as the second major climate change issues next to 
increasing flooding risk in its adaptation programme Rotterdam Climate Proof. No concrete 
measures were taken yet; most of the current activities concern information gathering and 
pilot projects. Heat and drought are not being considered in municipality disaster plans. In 
Twente, where drought is a reoccurring problem, the Water Board is now cooperating with 
regional authorities (municipalities or other civil protection actors are not involved) and 
agricultural organisations to develop structural solutions to cope with drought. A national 
project that studies drought impacts informs regional water managers on the current situation 
regarding river discharges, (water) temperatures and groundwater. However, despite the fact 
that the National Safety Strategy considers drought/heat as a security issue (Section 1), the 
civil protection system is not involved in the initiatives mentioned above. 
4.2 Civil protection perceptions of climate change risks 
Interviewees in Rotterdam consider climate change impacts not to cause new risks that imply 
new working methods. Although the operational and strategic units in the Rotterdam civil 
protection system are now becoming more and more aware of the fact that they need each 
other’s expertise, this rapprochement is only very recent and did not consolidate yet. The two 
have different perspectives on how to deal with climate change. The operational civil 
protection unit is aware of climate change impacts, but view these impacts either to be 
‘regular’ disasters which are already included in the local disaster plans or as part of a distant 
future and therefore ‘too far and too broad’ to include in the current daily practices. Climate 
change does not fit into their short-term view of disaster plans running for four years. The 
more strategic-oriented civil protection unit, by contrast, strongly focus on climate change 
impacts (increasing risk of flooding and heat stress) by preparing for a ‘climate proof’ 
Rotterdam by 2025. New spatial planning projects are being designed based on the most 
recent climate change scenarios.  
The strategic-oriented civil protection unit that developed in Rotterdam seems to add 
the long-term horizon that is required in the civil protection system to prepare for climate 
change impacts as these are beyond the system’s experience. The Twente and IJsselland 
Safety Regions have not yet developed as well as the Rotterdam Safety Region, which was 
the front running example for the national development of Safety Regions. It might be a 
matter of time that also other Safety Regions develop strategic-oriented civil protection units. 
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Without these units the Twente and IJsselland Safety Regions currently have limited capacity 
to adapt their systems for climate change impacts.  
In Twente and IJsselland, the respondents to our survey perceive climate change as a 
rather to very important policy issue, but they consider climate change lesser to be an urgent 
issue. Risks attached to climate change impacts are assessed rather different. The respondents 
from both regions value flooding, heat waves, Lyme disease and drought as the most likely 
climate change induced risks (Figure 2). Striking is to note similarities and differences 
between the responses from both regions: although the impacts will be similar in both regions, 
some risks are clearly being differently perceived. Local flooding induced by heavy rain is 
expected to be a very likely risk in both regions, whereas flooding from surface water is 
assessed to be less likely for the Twente region.3 An increasing occurrence of malaria is 
judges to be rather unlikely; IJsselland respondents still rate this at 3.0, while Twente 
respondents rate only 2.4 on a 5-point scale. We could conclude from Figure 2 that Twente 
respondents rate the 8 climate change risks as less probable than the IJsselland respondents.  
 
Figure 2 Assessment of climate change risks in IJsselland and Twente4 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Local flooding from rain
Lyme desease
Drought
Heavier storms
Heat waves
Flooding from surface water
Snow and hail
Malaria
IJsselland
Twente
 
4.3 Effects of climate change on civil protection system changes  
To sum up, we conclude this section on the preparations for climate change by the civil 
protection system by addressing the third and overall research question on how far the recent 
changes in the civil protection system are caused by the perception of climate changes risk 
and what the driving factors are behind these changes. Several flooding disaster events 
influenced the perception of climate-induced risks in the Netherlands. Chronologically, in the 
                                               
3   Local flooding induced by heavy rain was rated 4.1 on a 5-point scale in both Twente and IJsselland; flooding 
from surface water was rated 3.5 in IJsselland and 2.8 in Twente. 
4 Respondents were asked to fill in their opinion on a 5-point scale (1=none, 5=very much) on how realistic an 
increase of each of the 8 climate change-induced risks would be; N = 60. 
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second half of the 1990s more attention was given to inland flooding risk caused by extremely 
high river discharges in 1993 and 1995. No clear changes in the civil protection system were 
observed, though a serious policy programme was implemented to give the rivers more room 
to flow. In the first decade of 2000, the flooding disaster caused by hurricane Katrina inspired 
politicians to improve our level of preparations for worst case flooding. The committees TMO 
and Delta Commission advised the government on flooding risk and ‘climate proofing’. These 
developments brought climate change -and adapting to it- high on the policy agenda.  
 The civil protection system in the Netherlands, however, was not directly affected by 
the developments that followed these events. Flooding is one of the scenarios the local, 
regional and national authorities prepare for, but the preparations as such have not changed 
because of the above mentioned events. The major institutional change we reported in our 
paper was the merge of the Safety Regions concept. This system of regional civil protection 
bodies was established after two non-climate related disasters struck the country in 2000. 
Climate change was not at stake in this development. Respondents indicate that climate 
change impacts should be covered by the ‘regular’ disaster management planning. The 
changes we observed were thus clearly event-driven, but the events that laid the basis for the 
most serious change were not related to climate change.  
5 Conclusions  
At the outset of our paper we presented three research questions that guided our study: 1) 
what are the recent institutional changes in the Dutch civil protection system? 2) what are 
recent changes in civil protection practice and civil protection actor perceptions of climate 
risks? and 3) to what extend are the recent changes in the civil protection system caused by 
the perception of climate changes risk, and what were driving factors for these changes? 
Addressing these questions lead us to concluding our paper by making three propositions.  
 Firstly, the most important recent change in the Dutch civil protection system was the 
establishment of a national structure of Safety Regions. This development was inspired by a 
need for closer cooperation to combat large-scale crises such as the 2000 Fireworks Disaster 
and the New Year’s Eve Fire. This development obviously was not related to any climate 
change impacts or scenario development. Still, climate change was placed on the policy 
agenda by the occurrences in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina had broken through the 
levees.  Secondly, we could not report any substantial changes in the policy and practices of 
the civil protection system. This can be explained from the fact that climate change risks and 
climate change adaptation as such are not being perceived as urgent or important. Thirdly, the 
civil protection system in the Netherlands is not (yet) preparing for climate change risks due 
to a limited perception of these risks. In Rotterdam, we could discern a clear gap between the 
strategic and the operational levels dealing with civil protection. Interviewees from both 
tracks stress the need for more time to ‘grow’ and to meet each others needs in order to cope 
with climate-change impacts. For the present, however, we can only conclude that there is a 
‘missing link’ between the existing practices and future aims in the preparedness of the 
Rotterdam civil protection system. 
 15 
Our findings underline the low priority politically is being paid to climate change and its 
related impacts and risks. Of course offer the large set of uncertainties associated with climate 
change a poor base for politicians that want to now where to make plans on. Still, it is also 
disturbing to find out that the interviewees expect to have plenty of time to wait and see what 
will change. They could already incorporate increasing impacts and frequencies in their 
current plans and not pass it on to next generations. It is crucial that we now start adopting 
measures to cope with future heat, drought, flood and increased rain that both cover the short 
and long term perspectives.  
 Our case studies showed a picture of a ‘missing link’ within the civil protection 
system. The Safety Regions might become that arena where the short-term focused, 
operational part of the civil protection system meets the long-term focused, strategic part. This 
new structure obviously needs time to grow and should be feed by the proper knowledge and 
information adapted to regional circumstances of the region that is now present at the 
different actors participating in the Safety Regions –the new government’s plan to reorganise 
the police regions comes at a bad moment.  
Our findings are likely not to be limited to the three cases we studied: municipalities 
and regions throughout Europe are being affected to a lesser or larger extend by the impacts 
from climate change and the risks that are caused by these impacts. The Dutch development 
towards a possible integration of the operational and strategic parts of the civil protection 
system could demonstrate to be a best practice to cope with future climatic hazards. 
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